1. Uncertain Preferences in Rational Decision (forthcoming in Inquiry).
The paper addresses the question whether uncertainty about preferences exists and should make a difference to rational decision-making. It opts for a positive answer.
2. Decisions and Higher-Order Knowledge (Nôus 2017). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about how one can avoid the consequence of having to bet one's life on a proposition one is certain about. The proposal is that decisions about higher level goods require higher-order knowledge.
1. Finding Closure for Safety (forthcoming in Episteme).
The paper offers a way of reconciling a closure condition with a safety condition on knowledge.
The paper defends Quine's statements about universal revisability against objections by David Chalmers.
3. Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities (Dialectica 2015, with S. Rosenkranz). Penultimate draft.
This paper asks which belief revision policy is best in response to peer disagreement.
4. A Note on Comparative Probability (Erkenntnis 2012, with N. Haverkamp). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about the link between positive probability and possibility. It addresses an argument by Williamson to the effect that this link cannot be upheld by looking at a way of getting it in a weak comparative framework for probability.
5. The Dynamics of Indexical Belief (Erkenntnis 2010). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about the Sleeping Beauty problem. It searches for a way of extending the Bayesian framework to indexical beliefs. The thirders solution is predicted.
6. Kann ich rational und ein Außenseiter sein? Außenseitermeinungen in der Wissenschaft (forthcoming in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung).
This is a paper in German about the question of whether one can be rational and an outsider in science.
1. The Past Tense View of Counterfactuals Revisited (Ergo, forthcoming)
The paper discusses the view that counterfactuals express at a later time what indicative conditionals expressed at an earlier time. It defends the traditional view about classifying conditionals into counterfactuals and indicatives.
2. Modus Ponens under the Restrictor View (Journal of Philosophical Logic 2018). Link to paper.
The paper looks at a variety of counterexamples to modus ponens from the perspective of the restrictor view of conditionals.
4. Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness (Mind 2014). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about credences in counterfactuals and how to best account for them semantically. The suggestion is that we may be able to explain them as ordinary credences in a proposition if we modify standard semantics by employing instead of a universal quantifier ranging over a set of relevant antecedent-worlds the epsilon-operator which arbitrarily selects one of those worlds.
5. A Note on Two Theorems by Adams and McGee (The Review of Symbolic Logic 2009). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about the possibility of having a three(or many)-valued logic for conditionals which accords with Adams's logic for conditionals.
1. Wondering What Might Be (PhilStudies 2010). Penultimate draft.
The paper looks at a possible way of how indicative conditionals might be linked to epistemic modals. Malte Willer has replied to this paper (here), and I have responded to his reply (here; this is a penultimate draft).
2. Epistemic Modals and Informational Consequence (Synthese 2010). Penultimate draft.
The paper concerns the treatment of epistemic modals by Yalcin (2007). In particular, it takes a closer look at the resulting logic of epistemic modals.
3. What Might Be and What Might Have Been (in a Volume on Strawson, with B. Schnieder and A. Steinberg). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about Strawson's theory of modals.
1. Grounding Mental Causation (Synthese 2016, with T. Kroedel). Penultimate draft.
In this paper, we apply the notion of grounding to the problem of mental causation. It has been replied to by Clark and Wildman (here).
2. Chance and Actuality (Philosophical Quarterly 2011). Penultimate draft.
The paper is about a little puzzle involving objective versus subjective chances of 'actually'-sentences.